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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THF STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE STEVENS CONSTRUCTION 
and HARTFORD INSURANCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DWINN A. HENION, Mother of 
BARI LYN BLAIR, daughter of 
BARRY A. BLAIR, deceased, 
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 19006 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs maintain that the average weekly wage is the 
hourly rate multiplied by the hours which would have been 
worked for the week had there been no accident. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-75(1) (c). Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 3S-l-75(3) justifies the inclusion of an out-of-town sub-
sistence allowance. § 35-1-75(3) states: 
If none of the methods in subsection (1) will 
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a par-
ticular case, the commission shall use such other 
method as will, based upon facts presented, fairly 
determine the employee's average weekly wage. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW 
NOR IS IT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
The initial problem with defendant's argument is that 
neither the defendant nor the Industrial Commission relied on 
§ 35-1-75(3) in the proceedings before the Industrial Commis-
sion. Defendants presented no evidence to show that the 
statutory formula did not reflect the decedent's wages, as 
was their burden. Further, the Industrial Commission made no 
finding that the statutory formula unfairly reflected the 
decedent's wages. Having failed to rely upon or comply with 
§ 35-1-75(3) before the Industrial Commission, defendant's 
argument should be rejected. 
POINT II 
BEFORE S 35-1-75(3) CAN BE APPLIED, THE 
OUT-OF-TOWt' SUBS I S'IENCE ALLOl'1ANCE MUST 
QUALIFY AS "WAGES". 
Defendants suggest that under S 35-1-75 (3) the Industrial 
Commission has discretion to determine what is "fair" in 
light of "a child who will never see her father." Brief of 
Defendants, pp. 5, 14. Though this is certainly a hardship 
for the child, it is not a factor in determining the dece-
dent's wages. Nor is the proper test a question of what the 
Industrial Commission determines is fair. As noted in Crai.2_. 
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L·•· Produce v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1354 (Utah 
J"HJ), the test where the statutory formula does not properly 
reflect wages is what method "fairly determine[s] the injured 
employee's weekly wage." Even assuming that § 35-1-75(3) can 
now he argued, its application must rest upon a determination 
that an out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages. 
POINT III 
THE DETERMINATION WHETHER AN OUT-OF-TOWN 
SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE IS WAGES REQUIRES A 
REVIEW OF THE COMMON DEFINITION OF WAGES. 
Defendants argue that it is minimally useful to look at 
the common definition of "wages" since § 35-1-75 specifically 
defines "wages" by formula. Brief of Defendants, p. 8. If 
this is true, there is no need to look past the statutory 
formula which defendants now challenge as unfair. And if it 
is not true, against what standard can defendants claim un-
fairness if not the common definition of wages. Defendant's 
recent reliance on a fairness argument belies their claim 
that the common definition of "wages" is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, an examination of Section 75 mandates a 
resort to the common definition of wages. Subsections (1) 
and (2) define "average weekly wages" through various 
rurmulas. Under § 35-1-75 (3), this average weekly wage 
stands unless it "will not fairly determine the average 
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weekly wage." § 35-1-75 (3). This definition is circular ,;., 
non-sensical unless the common definition of wages is applie0 
under § 35-1-75 (3). Defendants must accept the wage formula 
or resort to the common definition of "wages". 
POINT IV 
A SUBSISTENCE ALLOWAKCE IS NOT "WAGES". 
Defendants have not claimed that the common definition of 
"wages" offered by plaintiffs is incorrect. However, they 
suggest that an out-of-town subsistence allowances falls 
within that definition since the employer agreed to pay it 
and could be compelled to do so in a court of law. Brief of 
Defendants, p. 8. In so arguing defendants have not used the 
common definition of "wages" but rather have substituted it 
with an uncommon one, that whatever an employer agrees to 
give an employee is wages whether it is given for work per-
formed or expenses incurred in the course of employment. 
Under defendant's approach, reimbursements or allowances by 
an employer for tools and uniforms would qualify as wages. 
As explained in plaintiff's Brief, although wages and sub-
sistences allowances are an employer's cost of doing busi-
ness, a subsistence allowance is not compensation for work 
but rather payment to cover expenses incurred because of the 
work. It ends when the expenses end. Wages continue to be 
paid so long as the work is performed. 
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1·11 [s common distinction between waqes and subsistence 
-,1 :u1-1ances is further illustrated by their income tax treat-
111Pnt. Under Internal Revenue Code § 61 (1954 as amended) 
hoth wages and subsistence allowances are "income". However, 
"expenses paid or incurred in connection with the performance 
of services by the taxpayer as an employee under a reimburse-
ment or other expense allowance arrangement with his em-
ployer" are a deduction for arriving at the adjusted gross 
income. Internal Revenue Code § 62 (c) (2) (1954 as amended). 
The net result is that a subsistence allowance used as in-
tended is not earnings or wages. 
This same distinction is even more clearly drawn in the 
treatment of the federal withholding tax on wages and the 
social security tax. Neither tax applies to an out-of-town 
subsistence allowance. In Central Illinois Public Service 
Company v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 55 L.Ed.2d 82, 98 
s.ct. 917 (1978), the government claimed that a $1.40 allow-
ance paid to employees for lunch while on authorized travel 
wAs wages. The Supreme Court rejected the government's posi-
tion and found that under a broad definition of "wages" in 
the tax law, an allowance to cover employment related ex-
penses was not a wage. 
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As commonly understood, a subsistence allowance for 
out-of-town work is not payment for labor and therefore, 
cannot be considered wages. 
Defendants cite several cases to support their claim th 2t 
an out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages. A review of 
these cases either shows the contrary or a rejection of the 
rule cited by Larson and espoused by the Industrial Commis-
sion. 
In Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 
P.2d 612 (1950), a ranch hand received "$125 per month plus a 
house, utilities, milk, butter, eggs and meat whenever cattle 
were slaughtered, for [himself], his wife and three chil-
dren." Without the issue being raised, the court treated 
these items as compensation for labor and included them in 
the wage computation. Unlike Matlock, the decedent did not 
receive his subsistence except when he worked 
out-of-town. Nor was it meant to cover the woman with whom 
he was living or any children. It was not intended as com-
pensation for labor but as an allowance for employment 
related expenses. 
The inapplicability of Matlock is illustrated by Moore-
head v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz. App. 96, 495 P.2d 8E6 
(1972), as discussed in plaintiff's Brief. There a travel 
allowance for out-of-town work was not considered wages. In 
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1 with Matlock, the court noted that the extra benefits 
c1 ,1 were intended to meet expenses "which would con-
""'" substantially unchanged whether Matlock was employed or 
not" while Moorehead's travel allowance was to cover "ex-
pE11ses which will cease with the cessation of [his] employ-
ment." 495 P.2d at 869. Since the travel allowance was not 
intended as compensation for services performed, it was not 
wages. 
This same distinction applies to Morgan v. Equitable Gen-
eral Insurance Co., 383 So.2d 1067 (La. App. 1980) and Ardoin 
v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 134 So.2d 323 
(La. App. 1961). Morgan involved a domestic servant who was 
given some meals at work and taxi fare to work. The court 
found that these items were intended as compensation for ser-
vices. Ardoin apparently involved a dairy hand who was given 
a home and milk. The court found that these items were in-
tended as compensation for services. Neither Morgan or 
Ardoin presents an out-of-town subsistence allowance to cover 
employment related expenses. 
Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 s.c. 165, 4 S.E. 2d 7 (1939), 
presents the opposite situation of Matlock. Rather than 
living on the ranch like Matlock, Bannister was a truck 
who lived on the road. He received $12.50 salary and 
1l 12 per week for board and lodging. The court included the 
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board and lodging as wages since it was intended as compen-
sation for services. Again, this is not the situation pre-
sented here. 
In Cosgriff v. Duluth Fireman's Relief Association, 233 
Minn. 233, 46 N.W.2d 250 (1951), the applicant was a fireman 
and a member of the Duluth Fireman's Relief Association. On 
behalf of the Association, he attended a conference and was 
compensated at $10.00 per day plus railroad expenses. The 
compensation was also to cover his board and lodging. Based 
upon a specific statutory provision, the wages were found to 
be $10.00 per day. The railroad reimbursement was not in-
cluded. Since there is no such statutory provision in Utah, 
the case is inapplicable. 
The last two cases cited by defendants apparently repre-
sent a rejection of the rule enunciated by Larson. In 
American Surety Co. v. Underwood, 74 S.W. 2d 551 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1934), the applicant was a traveling salesman who was 
reimbursed for meals and lodging away from home which the 
court found to be wages. In doing so the court rejected the 
reasonable economic gain rule discussed by Larson. In 
v. G. R. Kinney Co., Inc., 7 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1938), a 
traveling salesman received a salary plus living expenses. 
Without discussion, the court found the living expenses to be 
earnings. It appears the court was following a rationale 
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1milar to Matlock and Bannister or rejecting the real eco-
nomic gain rule. 
Defendants also make the argument that there is no real 
increase in expenses because of out-of-town work. Brief of 
Defendants, pp. 12, 13. Such a claim ignores common experi-
ence. Temporary lodging, extra travel and eating out on the 
road are all substantially greater than maintaining a house-
hold. Furthermore, decedent was required to do both. 
Presumably to bolster this argument, defendants argue 
that there is no evidence to show that the decedent ever used 
his out-of-town subsistence allowance for out-of-town ex-
penses. Defendants even suggest that he may have slept in a 
tent and brought his food with him. Such an argument ignores 
the burden which was on defendants to show that the out-of-
town subsistence allowance was wages. Furthermore, if the 
defendants now rely on a real economic gain argument, it was 
their burden to prove that the allowance was that. Having 
failed to carry their burden, it must be assumed that the 
decedent used the allowance to cover his out-of-town employ-
ment related expenses as intended. 
CONCLUSION 
The death benefits must be paid on the basis of wages. 
Wages are not whatever is received from the employer but 
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rather compensation for services. Since the out-of-town 
subsistence allowance was intended to cover employment 
related expenses and not as compensation for services, its 
inclusion in the death benefits is improper. If a real eco-
nomic gain test is applied, there is no proof by defendants 
of such a gain. 
The out-of-town subsistence allowance should not be used 
in computed death benefits based upon wages. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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